In economy a cause rarely produces a sole effect. If it is true that comes by particular evidence an effect showy, there are some secondary by doesn’t neglect, as, for example, the negative “externalities”. In economic politics, perhaps because it is a superstructure of the economy, it is suggested to assign to a tool a sole objective, in the hypothesis that is not able be reached more of one. Perhaps this explains the motive for which to the central banks it is entrusted only the task of price control, that is the rate of inflation, with the tool of the monetary policy. It is surely a progress in comparison with largely affirmed hypothesis in past, that assigned to the monetary politics functions of control of the inflation and, contemporarily and contradictorily, even the economic growth and the reduction of the rate of inflation and of unemployment. But, the abandonment of this formulation and the affirmation of the oneness of the objective, if we have disposable only one tool, in accordance with the known Tinbergen formulation, doesn’t exempt us from the analysis of the secondary effects, that every action produces.
We form the hypothesis that the oneness of the objective is a wise politics, then validates.
The inflation is a monetary phenomenon, and on that it seems to be worthwhile by now keynesians and not, and, besides, the money is not directly all in hand to the central bank, because they exist money not in bills, as, for example, the credit circulation and the electronic money. So, we go back started again to give prevailing credit to the tool of the rate of interest, that is even an old object, but, by the look, it is the only maneuverable with safety from the central bank.
In these last months the BCE, too admitting that the rate of inflation has by now crossed the ceiling of 2%, continues to maintain 1% the basic applied rate to the operational banks, because it thinks that a measure more elevated would be able strangle the economic recovery.
In the Frankfurt board sit applied economists with a vast experience and we can confide on they options, having certainty that to the opportune moment they will assume the better policies, taking one thing with another and that the tool of the basic rate of interest will be used with the wisdom sense and sense of timing.
However, we can propose some considerations.
The rates of interest in a free market can be imposed by the monetary politics only short-term and the “zero” rate doesn’t throw and doesn’t sustain any growth, as the recent the Japan history has shown. The capital, that is the saving, it is a factor of the production that, as the other, has to be remunerated. The BCE not only is maintaining low the rate, but continues to realize thick acquisitions of government securities and so it introduces continually liquidity in the system, but sooner or later will drain the excess. This politics is not able to help the rate of inflation, neither help substantially the recovery, that, also it is not exuberant, it is worth of the real economy and not of the money. It is sufficient to read the editorial of the Bulletin of February of the BCE, that, even when it speaks of inflation, as we have said by now over the 2% threshold, and of slim recovery in 2011 seems to tread warily, justly not to scatter alarmism, affirms: «the current levels of the rates of reference of the BCE remain still suitable and it has therefore definite to leave them unchanged». Since the inflation grows, it means that is the moment, already it is known in recent years, to consider that the nominal interest rate doesn’t cover neither the loss of the capital for effect of the more elevated inflation. Let’s suppose that the savers, too acculturized by recent experiences, accept the loss and ask if the credit at “sale” rates, fed by the created liquidity from politics monetary of the BCE, flowed to the market through the drive belt of the banking system, it comes really asked for the firms. The question is: «the horse drinks?». Here is the point: the horse doesn’t drink or it drinks a little and it is that denounces the same BCE in the bulletin: «the monetary ample aggregate and the loans have continued to record a modest growth».
That shows that the recovery cannot be entrusted to the money or to the credit only. If it is enough a one percentage point in more to compromise the recovery it means that we are financing productive process with a low value added and of scarce technological content and then we are forced to file the wages continuously and to reduce the inside consumptions. It is not by this way that we can to leave the crisis, above all if the cause is in the finance.